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I. AGGRESSION OR SELF-DEFENSE?
On June 7, 1981, the State of Israel conducted an aerial attack

on the Iraqi nuclear reactor known as Tamuz I located near

Baghdad.1 The attack was carried out by F15 and F16 aircraft
supplied by the United States. The reactor was damaged severely
and three Iraqi civilians and one French technician were killed.2
On June 8 Israel announced'the attack and described it as an act
of legitimate self-defense, claiming Iraq planned to construct nuclear weapons. On the same day the Republic of Iraq requested
an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider what it described as an act of aggression in violation of the
United Nations Charter.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted a definition of
aggression by consensus in resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. It states in article 1 that aggression is "the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereign integrity or political inde1. For a factual description of the aerial attack, see Russell, Attack-and
Fallout: Israel Blasts Iraq's Reactor and Creates a Global Shock Wave, TE,
June 22, 1981, at 24; N.Y. Times, June 9, 1981, at Al, col. 4. For an analysis of
the event, see, e.g., Rubin, That Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Reactor: The
Facts-and Deeper Issues, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 24, 1981, at 12.

2. Interview with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Issues and Answers
(June 28, 1981) (Television Broadcast by American Broadcasting Company).
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pendence of another State," and adds in article 2 that "the first
use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression
...

"

In all legal formulations, self-defense is considered lawful,

in contrast with aggression, which is considered unlawful.3 Consequently, the issue to be resolved is whether the fact situation
should be appraised, according to the criteria of law, as aggression
or self-defense.
II.

THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF-DEFENSE

A.

The Basic InternationalLaw Criteria

The international law setting forth the criteria for self-defense
and distinguishing it from aggression has been enunciated and
developed by the community of states over a considerable period
of time. The objective of these legal doctrines is to protect all
states' inclusive interests or values in promoting peaceful settlement of international disputes and deterring acts of aggression.
Self-defense is most clearly justified in law in response to an
armed attack. The legal criteria, however, also permit reasonable
and necessary anticipatory self-defense. 4 Anticipatory self-defense
is regarded as a highly unusual and exceptional action that may

be employed only when the evidence of a threat is compelling and
the necessity to act is overwhelming. 5 "Reasonable and necessary"
means the exact opposite of arbitrariness in decision.$
Customary law prescribes the use of peaceful procedures, if
they are available, as the first requirement of self-defense. The
second requirement is actual necessity, as opposed to a sham or
pretense, for the use of force in responding coercion. The third is
proportionality in responding coercion. The second and third requirements always have been applied with more rigor to a claim
of anticipatory self-defense than to a claim of defense against an
3. E.g., [1980] YEARBOOK OF THE INT'L LAW COMMISSION, vol. 2, part 2, art.
34, 52-53 (1981).
4. See, e.g., 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1971); M.
McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 231-32
(1961). The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense was examined in 1 TRIAL OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS B1EFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT
NUREMiERG 205-09 (1947) [hereinafter cited as JUDGMENT AT NUREMBURG].
5. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4; JUDGMENT AT NUREMBURG, supra note 4, at
205-09.
6. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 4, at 218.
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armed attack.7 Even if the requirement of actual necessity is met,
the response must be proportional to the character of the initiating coercion. An example of an application of the proportionality
requirement is provided by the wide community rejection of Nazi
Germany's claimed right of military response to alleged, but trivial, incidents on the Polish border. Under no legal authority could
the massive land, air, and sea assault upon Poland in September
1939 be justified as proportional to the alleged Polish threat
against Germany.8
The United Nations Charter provides a codification of the requirements of the customary law. The customary law stipulation

of peaceful procedures as the first step, except in the response to
an armed attack, is enunciated in article 2(3) of the Charter:
All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
Paragraph 4 of the same article prohibits aggression:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 51 of the Charter incorporates the customary law of
self-defense in the following words:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs ....
Because claims of self-defense must be examined in the light of
the most accurate interpretation of the article, it is significant
that the phrase "armed attack" in the English text should not be
read in its narrow sense. The negotiating histoiy at the San Francisco Conference reveals that article 51 was intended to incorporate the entire customary law or "inherent right" of self-defense.'
The comprehensive incorporation of the customary law includes
reasonable and necessary anticipatory self-defense since this has
always been a part of the customary law. This negotiating history
governs the meaning of the article in any of the five official languages of the Charter. The French text, which uses the broad
7. Id. at 231.

8. JUDGMENT AT NuREBMURG, supra note 4, at 198-204.
9. See 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 680 (1945).
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term "aggression armee," encompassing the conception of "armed
attack" but not limited to it, is a more accurate reflection of the
negotiating history than the English text if the latter is read out
of the context of the negotiating history. 0
Maintenance of public order is the most basic task of any legal
system, whether domestic or international. The responsibility of a
domestic order system is to exercise effective community control
over private violence. By analogy, the responsibility of a world
legal order is to exercise effective community control of violence
and coercion exercised by national states. The world legal order
protects the values of all states and of all peoples by promoting
peaceful procedures and deterring aggression. Article 2(3) and (4),
and article 51 of the U.N. Charter establish a world legal order
system.
B.

The .Specific InternationalLaw Criteriafor Anticipatory
Self-Defense

One of the leading instances in which the legal principle of anticipatory self-defense, which is part of the "inherent right" referred to in article 51 of the Charter, has been applied is the famous Caroline incident," which involved a steamer of that name
employed in 1837 to transport personnel and equipment from
United States territory across the Niagara River to Canadian
rebels on Navy Island and then to the mainland of Canada. Great
Britain (then the sovereign in Canada) apparently expected that
the United States would stop the military assistance to the rebels,
but the latter was either unwilling or unable to do so, and the
Caroline remained a threat to Canada. Thereafter, Canadian
troops crossed the Niagara River into United States territory, and
after a conflict in which at least two United States nationals were
killed, they set the Caroline afire and it was wrecked on Niagara
Falls. In the ensuing controversy, Great Britain claimed its actions were justified as reasonable and necessary anticipatory selfdefense. The United States did not deny that circumstances
might exist in which Great Britain lawfully could invoke such
10. The Inter-American collective defense system preceded the U.N. Charter
and the latter was drafted to be consistent with the former. See Mallison, Lim-

ited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National or Collective Defense Claims Valid Under InternationalLaw; 31 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 335, 36671 (1962).
11. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
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self-defense, but denied that they existed in this situation. Nevertheless, the controversy was terminated, following a British diplomatic apology, but, significantly, without any British assumption
of legal responsibility for the deaths of the two Americans, the
wounding of others, and the destruction of the Caroline. The absence of further legal claims by the United States should be interpreted as tacit acquiescence in the lawfulness of the British
action.
The Caroline case is best known for Secretary of State Webster's formulation of the requirements of self-defense as involving
a "necessity of self-defence, [which is] instant, overwhelming,

leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 12
The quoted wording concerning "no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" is misleading because when actual necessity exists, international law requires a state invoking anticipatory
self-defense to go through a process of deliberation resulting in
the choice of lawful, that is, proportional, means of responding
coercion. The British responding coercion was proportional to the
threat posed by the ship.
A more recent example arose during the Second World War. 3
Following the Vichy French Government armistice with Germany
in June 1940, many vessels of the French Navy took refuge in
Alexandria, Egypt, Oran, French North Africa, or Martinique in
the West Indies. In early July the British presented the French
naval commander in each location with proposals setting forth alternatives concerning the disposition of French naval vessels, any
one of which was designed to prevent the vessels from coming
under German control. The first and preferred proposal was for
the French naval vessels to join the Royal Navy and continue the
war against Germany. The second alternative involved the complete demilitarization of the French vessels so that they would be
of no use to Germany. The third alternative, which the British
emphasized would be used only with great reluctance if the first
two were rejected, was that Great Britain would attack and sink
the vessels. At Alexandria and Martinique the French naval commanders accepted the second alternative. At Oran the first two
alternatives were rejected and after further fruitless negotiations,
British naval and air forces attacked and sunk or severely dam12. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, April 24, 1841, 29 BRITISH AND FOR1129, 1138 (1840-41) [hereinafter cited as STATE PAPERS].

EIGN STATE PAPERS

13. 1 L.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

303 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
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aged the French warships.
If a realistic appraisal is made of the grim realities confronting
Great Britain, the British attack on the warships of its former
ally and accompanying incursions into French territorial waters
and airspace were justified as anticipatory self-defense. Very little

other than British naval and air power stood between the victorious German armies and successful invasion of the United Kingdom. Acquisition of major elements of the French Navy probably
would have made a German invasion possible. The applicable
principles of international law did not require the British to defer
action until after the French warships were incorporated into the
German Navy. There is no record of disapproval of the British
action except from Axis sources. Respected international legal authority has appraised the British action as lawful anticipatory
self-defense. 1 '
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 196215 provides another recent example. A threat to the United States was revealed by photographic evidence of intercontinental missile sites placement in
Cuba. When Ambassador Stevenson made them available, these
photographs were decisive in changing the climate of opinion,
first in the Security Council and then in the world. The missiles
and launching sites were being installed in secret and in the face
of Soviet diplomatic assurances that no offensive weapons would
be placed in Cuba. There is no reason to believe that further diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union would have changed its
determination to install these weapons with nuclear potential,
and accompanying launching sites, in Cuba. Among the alternative recommendations presented to President Kennedy was the
proposal to bomb the missile sites. Some international lawyers
thought this would be fully justified in law because of the great
danger to the entire Western Hemisphere caused by this Soviet
attempt to drastically upset the nuclear balance of power.16 President Kennedy, however, selected a limited naval blockade or
quarantine-interdiction as the method to prevent the introduction of further offensive weapons and to bring about the removal
of those present. This method permitted the use of diplomatic
means at the United Nations and elsewhere and ultimately re14. Id.
15. See generally Mallison, supra note 10.
16. Former Secretary of State Acheson was one such lawyer. R. KENNEDY,
THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN Mssmn CRisis 37-38 (Signet ed. 1969).
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suited in the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement that terminated
the missile crisis and led to the withdrawal of the missiles from
Cuba.
A national state is entitled to invoke national self-defense and
the United States did this on October 22d. In appraising whether
each of the legal requirements has been met in an invocation of
anticipatory self-defense, it is highly significant that on October
23d the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American
States invoked collective self-defense on behalf of the inter-American community. The regional decision-makers dealt with the
same fact situation that the United States dealt with on the previous day and came to the same conclusion that there existed an
actual necessity for anticipatory self-defense. 17 The Organ of Consultation also approved the specific measures undertaken by the
United States, and by the time the limited naval blockade or
quarantine-interdiction ended, ships from a number of Latin
American navies were participating in the enforcement of the
blockade. 18
The severely limited military measures employed by the United
States amounted to the least possible use of the military instrument of national policy. If it had not been successful, more coercive use of military power could have been justified under international law. The legal consequence of the restricted use of
military force is that the proportionality test in even its most rigorous and extreme form was met easily. In addition to the approval of the United States measures by the Organization of
American States, the measures met with wide approval within the
United Nations."9
I. THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw
REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF-DEFENSE TO THE ATTACK OF JUNE

7

If the Israeli claim of lawful self-defense can be justified, it
must on the basis of necessary and reasonable anticipatory selfdefense. Consequently, Israel must meet the stringent requirements of anticipatory self-defense rather than the less demanding
requirements of self-defense in response to an actual armed
attack.
17. Mallison, supra note 10, at 378-79.
18. Id. at 392-94.

19. Id. at 340-43.
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A. The Participants-Claimantsand Their Objectives
The State of Israel is the preeminent military power in the
Middle East region. Its efficient armed forces are supplied with
the most modern equipment and munitions. In addition, Israel
has a substantial nuclear program. In the early part of President
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program, the United States entered into a research reactor agreement with Israel which involved a substantial money grant but the transfer of only small
quantities of enriched uranium. 0 During the summer and early
fall of 1957, President Eisenhower and Chairman Strauss of the
United States Atomic Energy Commission were eager to enter a
power reactor agreement with Israel authorizing the transfer of
substantial quantities of enriched uranium as well as requiring inspection to prevent diversion of the uranium to military purposes.
At the outset, inspection was to be done by the United States and
subsequently by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
when its inspection procedures became operative.21
At that time Israel had a nuclear energy agreement with the
French Republic, which had been its ally in the tripartite attack
upon Egypt in 1956. Insofar as the United States was aware, there
were no requirements of peaceful uses or inspection of any kind
involved in the French-Israeli agreement.2 The objective of the
United States, with the realization that Israel was the state with
the greatest nuclear weapons potential in the region, was to prevent or at least delay as long as possible the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The efforts of the United
States to involve Israel in a controlled and inspected cooperation
agreement were unsuccessful. Israel is neither a state-party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),3 nor have its nuclear facilities

ever been subjected to IAEA inspection.24
20. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,
July 12, 1955, United States-Israel, 6 U.S.T. 2641, T.I.A.S. No. 3311, 219
U.N.T.S. 185.
21. W.T. Mallison served on the United States Atomic Energy Commission
with responsibility for the negotiation of Atoms for Peace Agreements in the
Asian-African area (1957-58).
22. The terms of this former agreement were not known and it was assumed
in the United States Atomic Energy Commission that the agreement was secret.
23. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
24. Article 3 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligated non-nuclear weapons
states to have I.A.E.A. inspection. By refusing to become a party to the Non-
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Iraq is the other major participant. In common with other oil
exporting countries, Iraq has been making a significant effort to
broaden its economic base through technology and education.
The Tamuz I research reactor, one of two supplied by France for
Tuwaitha as part of a 1975 agreement for cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, was an important part of this development program.2 5French cooperation in the establishment of
a "nuclear university" to train Iraqi scientists and technicians in
nuclear technology is also anticipated. Iraq is a state-party to the
NPT and has had its nuclear installations inspected on a regular
basis by the IAEA."
In appraising the claims of the participants, it is necessary to
inquire whether the objective of a particular claimant is only its
exclusive interests or broader inclusive interests shared by
others.27 In the present fact situation, Israel appears to have acted solely for its own perceived interests or values. Prime Minister Begin made the point explicitly in response to a question concerning the Arab reaction to the June 7 attack: "I don't care
' Unfortunately,
about the Arab world. I care about our lives."28
from the standpoint of genuine Israeli national interests, this approach fails to take into account the factual interdependencies
which exist in the real world, the consequent mutuality of meaningful national security, and the indivisibility of regional peace.
In contrast, Iraq, in addition to asserting its own right to national security, has recognized wider community interests, including freedom from aggression and coercion. The Iraqi interest in
applying the legal order system of the United Nations serves the
inclusive interests or values of the world community. This is confirmed by the comprehensive community support given the Iraqi
claims in the Security Council.
Proliferation Treaty, Israel avoided such inspection.
25. Donnely & Pilat, Nuclear Energy: Iraq's Nuclear Energy Program and
Intentions, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Issue Brief 1B 81001) (1981), at

1.
26. U.N. Doc. S.IP.V. 2280 at 37-60 (1981) (statement of Mr. Eklund, Director-General of I.A.E.A.) [hereinafter cited as S.IP.V. 2280] (The Provisional
Verbatim Records present statements as delivered and the Security Council Official Records, when subsequently issued, sometimes contain minor variations

from the texts as delivered.).
27. See generally M. McDOUGAL & F. FELiCIANO, supra note 4, at 222-24
(emphasizing the juridical importance of this inquiry).
28. Washington Post, June 9,1981, at All, col. 1.
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The central purpose of the customary or "inherent" right of
self-defense, which is incorporated by reference in article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, is the conservation of the values,
both human and material, of a defending state. As a basic rule
the doctrine of self-defense does not permit extension of the defender's values. 29 In the same way, damage or destruction of an-

other's values may not be undertaken except when all the requirements of lawful self-defense have been met. Both the
Caroline and Oran incidents involved the destruction of militarily
significant values under conditions in which the acts were legally
justified.
The destruction of the Caroline and of the French ships at
Oran provide the most likely possible legal authority, through the
use of analogy, for the Israeli attack on June 7. The persuasiveness of an analogy, however, depends upon the similarity between
the factual context and the values involved in the analogy and
those of the event to be appraised in law. At the outset, it is acknowledged that the vessels at Oran were warships which, after
the failure of peaceful methods, became military objects of attack.
The Caroline was not a legally commissioned warship, but the
military activity in which it was employed assimilated it to that
status. It is neither logical nor lawful to use a merchant ship for
offensive military operations and then to claim its immunity from
counter-attack.30 In the Security Council, only Israel claimed that
the Tamuz I reactor was a military facility. Consequently, analogies involving the destruction of military values cannot serve as
valid legal authority for the Israeli action, which involved the destruction of both human and material civilian values. Other features indicating a basic lack of similarity between the Israeli June
7 attack and the Caroline and Oran incidents include the Israeli
failure to make adequate use of peaceful procedures and the ensuing lack of international community support for the Israeli
position.
B. The Requirement of Peaceful Procedures
Assuming for the purpose of legal analysis that Israel perceived
a danger in the Iraqi nuclear program, it is clear that it undertook, at most, very limited peaceful procedures or diplomatic
29. M. McDOUGAL & F.
30.

FELICIANO,

supra note 4, at 181-82.

W. MALLISON, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE

106-23 (1966).
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measures to deal with the threat. There is no evidence of direct or
indirect diplomatic contacts with Iraq. Israel was not reassured
by whatever inquiries or protests it made to France. This is
suprising because the character of French nuclear assistance
changed drastically following the intense June 1967 hostilities in
the Middle East. At that time France terminated all military assistance to Israel, as it stated it would do with respect to any
state which commenced hostilities.3 1 Since then French nuclear
assistance has emphasized peaceful development and excluded
military uses.
In the circumstances claimed by Israel, it had ample time to
present a complaint to the Security Council, which would not be
expected to react with indifference to a nuclear menace. In addition, other measures could have been taken. A genuine concern
about the adequacy of International Atomic Energy Agency inspection procedures could be addressed to the IAEA, which has a
strong interest not only in maintaining the integrity of its procedures, but in improving them whenever possible. Moreover, the
great powers and the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as
well as all of the states in the Middle East, including Israel, have
a legitimate national security interest in efficient IAEA inspection
procedures. It may be suggested on behalf of Israel that it did not
use this type of response to an assumed actual necessity because
no effective changes in terms of improved inspection procedures
or adherence to the NPT would have resulted. If this were a
problem, Israel could have greatly enhanced the prospects of success by becoming a party to the NPT and opening its own nuclear
installations to IAEA inspection. It would have at least been difficult, and probably impossible, for Iraq to refuse additional international inspection had Israel agreed to the same inspection for
itself. Of course, effective international inspection would not be
consistent with the development of nuclear weapons by any state.
In the event of evidence of Iraqi violation of its obligations under
the NPT, this would be a matter for the world community including the state-parties to the NPT to deal with and not a matter for
unilateral state action. In view of these circumstances, it is clear
31.

See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., A SE-

LECT CHRONOLOGY AND BACKGROUND DocuMENTs RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST

263-66 (Legislative Reference Service, rev. ed. 1969) (Statement of French policy

concerning the Middle East conflict by Pres. DeGaulle in his press conference,

Nov. 27, 1967) [hereinafter cited as SELECT

CHRONOLOGY].
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that Israel did not meet the peaceful procedures requirement for
anticipatory self-defense.
C.

The Significance of a Threat of Attack as the Basis for
Establishing Necessity

Because no actual attack upon Israel by Iraq is involved in the
fact situation, it is necessary to examine the character of the alleged threat against Israel to determine if the threat establishes
the necessity for anticipatory defensive coercion. There is no legal
authority empowering a state to employ coercion against a speculative or non-imminent threat. The most authoritative source as
to the Israeli claimed character of the threat is the Government
of Israel. Mr. Yehuda Blum, the Permanent Representative of
Israel at the United Nations,-2 described the perception in these
terms, inter alia, in the Security Council on June 12, 1981:
A threat of nuclear obliteration was being developed against
Israel by Iraq, one of Israel's most implacable enemies."'
*

*

*

In recent years, Iraq has been the most active Arab State in the
nuclear34field. Its goal has been the acquisition of a military nuclear
option.

No amount of bluster can hide one simple, basic fact: Iraq's nuclear programme has, beyond a shadow of doubt, just one aim - to
acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems for them."
One conclusion which follows from the stated Israeli claims is
that no claim was made that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Another is that the imputation to Iraq of the objective of acquiring
nuclear weapons was based upon unverified assumptions. Still another is that the alleged Iraqi objective was to be carried out at
some time in the future, after Tamuz I became critical or "hot."
Israel also claimed that after the assumed future events took
place, Israel would be the target of an Iraqi nuclear attack. This
was a presumption in spite of the dangers such an attack would
present to Israeli and Arab civilians living in Israel, in the occupied territories, and in neighboring Arab states, as well as the im32. S./P.V. 2280, supra note 26, at 37-60 (statement of Mr. Yehuda Blum,
Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations).

33. Id. at 38-40.
34. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 48-50.
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mediate hazard of nuclear retaliation by Israel.
In the Hearings on the June 7 attack conducted by the United
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee 6 shortly after the attack, Mr. Roger Richter, who resigned from the staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to appear before the
Committee, presented testimony. He stated that one of his principal purposes was to identify LAEA deficiencies and the other was
to explain his belief that the Iraqi nuclear program had the purpose of developing a weapons capability "over the next several
years.

' 37

He presented a hypothetical plan involving many stages

by which Iraq could construct nuclear weapons in the future. He
stated: "During these years when the plutonium stockpile is growing, Iraq could master the techniques of fabricating the plutonium configurations required for a nuclear weapon."38 In other
words, he does not believe that Iraq has even the knowledge of
necessary techniques at the present time. Should one agree with
his assumption, contrary to substantial evidence, the Richter view
provides no support for the Israeli claim of a present need to use
responding coercion because the alleged capability was to be developed in future years.

The Caroline and Oran incidents, as well as the Cuban Missile
Crisis, involved the factually ascertained capability and
probability of armed attack in the immediate or near future,
which resulted in the necessity for responding coercion. In contrast, the alleged Iraqi threat claimed to be perceived by Israel
was neither supported by factual evidence nor thought to be in
the near future. In short, the Israeli claims, as stated by Mr.
Blum, fail to establish legal justification because they are both
speculative and non-imminent. Such claims have not provided
grounds for the legal conclusion of necessity in the past and cannot do so now.
A long period of planning for an attack also indicates that the
threat was not imminent. There is evidence that in the winter of
1979 Israel initiated a "combat file" concerning the proposed re36. The Israeli Air Strike: Hearings Before Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

37. Id. at 108.
38. Id. at 111. Other portions of Mr. Richter's testimony concerning the
methods by which a nuclear weapons capability could be developed were incon-

sistent with the French and Italian scientific evidence presented in the Security
Council. See infra text accompanying notes 80-88.
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actor site and an attack on it originally was planned for November 1980." As a matter of law, the attack, which was delayed
until June 7, 1981, must be characterized as premeditated on the
basis of these facts.
The claims advanced by Israel as grounds for an actual necessity for anticipatory self-defense have been further weakened by a
number of inaccurate statements made by Prime Minister Begin.
After these errors were exposed, the Washington Post stated,
"[A]t least six of Begin's specific claims have turned out [to be]
erroneous or misleading or have been disputed by French or U.S.
officials."4 The six claims referred to were that: (1) Iraq had refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the reactor (the reactor was
inspected last January and another inspection was scheduled for
June); (2) according to the Baghdad newspaper Al Thawra, Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein stated last October that the nuclear
reactor was intended for use against Israel, not against Iran (Mr.
Begin's office and the Israeli Foreign Ministry admitted subsequently that the quote never existed); (3) a secret underground
chamber forty meters (later said to be four meters) below the reactor had been built to avoid detection by the IAEA inspectors
(French nuclear experts denied the existence of such a chamber);
(4) Israel was informed by United States intelligence officials that

Iraq was preparing to build a nuclear bomb (Israel's chief of mili-

tary

intelligence admitted that no such information was given to
Israel by the United States); (5) the Iraqi reactor would become
critical, or "hot," in early July or early September at the latest
and Israel could not postpone bombing it for fear of scattering
radioactivity (according to French nuclear experts, it would not
have become critical until the end of 1981); (6) United States Defense Secretary Weinberger advocated cutting off economic and
military aid to Israel because of the bombing (Weinberger denied
this). These misstatements strongly indicate that Israel was not
in possession of facts to support its claims.
D. The Requirement of Proportionalityin Responding
Defensive Measures
Because the Israeli claim of actual necessity has not met the
criteria of international law, it is not necessary to inquire about
39. Russell, supra note 1, at 26.
40. Washington Post, June 17, 1981, at A22, cols. 1-2.
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the proportionality of the armed attack. Nevertheless, it may be
useful to assume for purposes of analysis that the requirements of
actual necessity, at least concerning the future Iraqi attack
claimed by Israel, were met, and to consider the proportionality
aspect of the aerial attack. The proportionality doctrine appraises
the character and quantum of responding coercion in relation to
the threat presented to the defending state. Thus the quantum of
the responding measures must be proportional, both in kind and
amount, to the character of the threat.,1 Secretary of State Webster, in what are probably among his least known and most valuable statements made during the Caroline incident, summarized
the requirements of proportionality in these terms: "[N]othing
unreasonable or excessive [is permitted], since the act, justified
by the necessity of self-defence,
must be limited by that necessity
42
it."
within
clearly
kept
and
he threat, as stated by Mr. Blum, was twofold: to manufacture nuclear weapons, and to use them against Israel, with both to
be done in the future. A present armed attack in response to an
assumed future but not imminent armed attack, even if the latter
is deemed to be nuclear, cannot meet the requirement of proportionality in even its most liberal formulation. This, however, is
exactly what Israel claimed to be legally justified. Neither the legal precedents of the customary law nor the provisions of the
United Nations Charter provide any authority to support such a
claim 7
E. The Significance of the Claimed State of War
In addition to Israeli attempts to find legal justification for its
claims of self-defense, it has made an alternative argument that
the June 7 bombing was justified by an existing state of war with
Iraq. On June 12, 1981, Mr. Blum stated in the Security Council,
"Iraq declares itself to have been in a state of war with Israel
since 1948." s He added: "Iraq has missed no opportunity to
make it clear that it will not abide by international law in respect
to Israel and that it reserves its freedom of action with regard to
Israel."*4 Although the quoted statement by Mr. Blum referred to
Iraqi "freedom of action" concerning Israel, it was used to at41.
42.

M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 4, at 217-18, 241-44.
STATE PAPERS, supra note 12, at 1138.

43. S.IP.V. 2280, supra note 26, at 42.
44.

Id.
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tempt to justify Israeli freedom of action against Iraq, which is
regarded by him as authorized by the "state of war" concept. In
the Israeli view, the wide freedom of action permitted by the
claimed "state of war" justified the June 7 attack.
There may be reason, however, to doubt the existence of the
"state of war" as a concept describing the legal relations between
Israel and Iraq. Responding to an inquiry from Dr. Ralph
Bunche, the United Nations Acting Mediator for Palestine, Iraq
stated through its Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 13,
1949: "I have the honour to inform you that the terms of armistice which will be agreed upon by the Arab States neighbours of
Palestine namely Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon will be
regarded as acceptable to my Government. '45 This Iraqi statement of position was transmitted by Dr. Bunche to the President
of the Security Council. The consequence of the Iraqi response is
a legal condition of non-belligerent armistice.
The "state of war" concept is not recognized in the United Nations Charter and, consequently, cannot prevail over the limitations of the Charter. The Charter mentions the word "war" only
once and this is in the context of the need "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war." 46 All of the other provisions
of the Charter use terms having a factual connotation. Examples
include "threat or use of force, 4 7 "any dispute, the continuance
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security,"'48 and "breach of the peace, or act of
' 49

aggression.
Of far more importance than a "state of war" as a legal concept
or theory is a state of war as a factual condition. An empirical
inquiry reveals that Iraq and Israel have not been involved in active hostilities, which indicate a factual state of war, since 1973.
The reality of the situation since that time has been a condition
of non-belligerency. It also may be accurately described as a de
facto cease-fire. Under either term it could have been used as the
indispensable first step to a meaningful peace with justice. The
Israeli attack has ruled out that positive opportunity because it
indicates that Israel claims freedom to attack even after a long

45. SELECT CHRONOLOGY, supra note 31, at 123.
46. U.N. Charter preamble, para. 1.

47. Id. art. 2(4).
48. Id. art. 33(1).
49. Id. art. 39.
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period of non-belligerency or cease-fire.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
REQUIREMENTS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 12-19, 1981

The consideration of the Iraqi claims in the Security Council
provides evidence of the way in which the world community appraised the situation and the relevant international law. The Security Council is the authorized organ of the world community to
maintain international peace and security. It began to meet on
Friday, June 12, in response to the Iraqi request for a meeting
based upon Iraq's complaint against Israel.
A.

The Iraqi Claims

Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi presented the Iraqi complaint. 5 After briefly recounting the well known facts of the June
7 attack, Mr. Hammadi described the Israeli nuclear development
program and contrasted it with the Iraqi program. He emphasized
that the Israeli program at Dimona had never been subjected to
any kind of international inspection. He pointed out that in spite
of "the basic imbalances and discrimination which are found in
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"51 Iraq
became a state-party to it and since that time the Iraqi nuclear
program has been subjected to regular inspection by the Interna-

tional Atomic Energy Agency. Mr. Hammadi concluded his presentation by stating that "a mere condemnation of this act of Israeli aggression ' 52 would be insufficient, and by making four
requests of the Security Council. These requests were: 53 (1) the
right of all states to develop peaceful nuclear programs should be
reaffirmed; (2) mandatory sanctions under the provisions of chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should be imposed upon
Israel to remove the existing menace to international peace and
security; (3) it should be decided that all states, and particularly
the United States, should refrain from providing Israel with military materials or technical cooperation or assistance; (4) the
Council should demand that all Israeli nuclear installations be
open to inspection and subjected to the safeguards system of the
50.
51.
52.
53.

S./P.V. 2280, supra note 26, at 16-37.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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International Atomic Energy Agency.
B.

The Israeli Counter-Claims

The Israeli position was presented by its Permanent Representative, Mr. Blum,54 who is on leave from his position as Professor
of International Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Mr.
Blum repeatedly emphasized the character of the Israeli attack as
"self-defense." He also indicated that several Middle Eastern
states were "sleeping more easily" in the knowledge that the Iraqi

"nuclear arms potential" had been smashed.

In support of the

self-defense argument, Mr. Blum said the Iraqi reactor had "less
than a month to go before" it "might have become critical."8 6 He
stated that Israeli diplomatic efforts to terminate European nuclear cooperation with Iraq had been unsuccessful and that consequently, "Israel was left with an agonizing dilemma. ' 57 In his
view, once the Iraqi reactor had become "hot," "any attack on it
would have blanketed the city of Baghdad with massive radioactive fallout," resulting in lethal or grievous harm to "tens of
thousands" at the least.5 8 He did not suggest that Iraq would
have nuclear weapons in its possession either before or after the
reactor became critical or "hot."
Mr. Blum provided several brief quotations concerning self-defense from international law writers including the late Sir
Humphrey Waldock, then the President of the International
Court of Justice. These quotations established the existence of a
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense in international law. Following his use of the international law writers, he concluded: "So
much for the legalities of the case."6 0 He did not attempt to apply
the doctrines of anticipatory self-defense to the facts of the
attack.
Another branch of the Israeli argument emphasized the claimed
hostile intentions of Iraq toward Israel. In this context he concluded: "In brief, this Council is now confronted with an absurd
situation. Iraq claims to be at war with Israel. Indeed it prepares
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

37-60.
38-40.
56.
52.
53-55.
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for atomic war. And yet it complains to the Security Council
when Israel, in self-defense, acts to avert nuclear disaster."61 Mr.
Blum charged Iraq with doing four things in order "to build up
the reserves of uranium needed to obtain self-sufficiency": 2 "(a)
it has bought weapons-grade enriched uranium on the international black market; (b) it has acquired uranium through bilateral
deals; (c) it has obtained enrichment facilities; and (d) it has begun an intensive search for uranium on its own territory."
In the conclusion of his initial presentation, Mr. Blum stated

that "Israel has always held the conviction that no international
conflict can be solved by the use of force."6 3 He charged Iraq and
other states with "unrestrained and unending aggression" against
Israel and accused the international community of "apathy and
appeasement.

'4

1

In a subsequent presentation on June 16, Mr. Blum stated that
other speakers in the Security Council had heaped a "barrage of
abuse" upon Israel as well as a "flood of distortion and deception." 5 He then set forth a list of several questions which implied
that Iraq had no need for a peaceful nuclear energy program because of its "abundant oil supplies" and that the principal purpose of its program was the development of nuclear weapons. 60
In a further statement on June 19, Mr. Blum devoted considerable attention to a criticism of the International Atomic Energy
Agency's inspection procedures. 7 On the same day, in connection
with the self-defense issue, he rejected the relevance of the Caroline incident which "occurred precisely 108 years before Hiroshima." 8 He also stated: "To assert the applicability of the Caroline principles to a State confronted with the threat of nuclear
destruction would be an emasculation of that State's inherent and
natural right of self-defense."6 9 Thereafter he added: "Indeed, the
concept of a State's right to self-defense has not changed
throughout recorded history... ", but "the concept took on new
61. Id. at 46.
62. Id. at 47.
63.

Id. at 58.

64.

Id.

65. U.N. Doc. S./P.V. 2284 at 36 (1981) [hereinafter cited as S.IP.V. 2284].
66. Id. He repeated the same questions on June 19. U.N. Doc. S./P.V. 2288
at 19-21 (1981) [hereinafter cited as S./P.V. 2288].
67. S./P.V. 2288, supra note 66, at 27-32.
68. Id. at 32.
69. Id.
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and far wider application with the advent of the nuclear era."'70
C. The Iraqi Responses
On June 12 Mr. Kittani, the Permanent Representative of Iraq
and subsequently the President of the General Assembly during
its Thirty-Sixth Session, responded to two of the points raised by
Mr. Blum the same day.71 He expressed astonishment that Iraq
was charged with searching "for uranium on its own territory"
because he assumed that a state has a right to search for minerals
within its own territory.7 2 He also expressed incredulity concerning Mr. Blum's statement that Israel had held the conviction that
"[n]o international conflict can be solved by the use of force." He
added: "Now if the members of the Council can believe that, they
'7 3
can believe anything.

On June 16 Foreign Minister Hammadi called the Council's attention to the unanimous resolution of the Islamic Group of
states. 4 This resolution, inter alia,condemned "the premeditated
and unprovoked aggression by Israel" and demanded "that Israel
pay prompt and adequate compensation for the damages suffered
75
by Iraq."
D. The United States
Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Representative of the United
States, spoke on June 19 of her government's commitment to a
just and enduring peace in the Middle East" and to Israel, which
she described as an "important and valued ally. '7 7 Mrs. Kirkpatrick referred to Israel's destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facility as
the most recent in a series of acts of violence including the invasion of Afghanistan, the war between Iraq and Iran, the Libyan
invasion of Chad, and the frequent violation of the territory and

sovereignty of Lebanon.76 She also stated:
[T]he means Israel chose to quiet its fears about the purposes of
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 36.
S./P.V. 2280, supra note 26, at 106-08.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
U.N. Doc. S./P.V. 2285 at 61-62 (1981).
Id.
S.IP.V. 2288, supra note 66, at 12-17.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 13.
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Iraq's nuclear programme have hurt, and not helped, the peace and
security of the area. In my Government's view, diplomatic means
available to Israel had not been exhausted and the Israeli action
has damaged the regional confidence that is essential for the peace
process to go forward.79

E. France and Italy
Mr. Leprette, the Permanent Representative of France,
presented the French appraisal on June 15.80 It can best be understood by considering his summaries of points, which were developed in more detail:
My Government rejects the allegations of the Israeli Government
that the Tamuz reactor "was intended to produce atomic bombs."
This mixing of peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy is inadmissible. The sole purpose of the Tamuz reactor was-and
is-scientific research, and the agreements between France and
Iraq exclude any use of it-even indirectly-for military
purposes.8 1
*

*

*

To conclude this technical aspect, it would be absurd for a country wishing to manufacture a nuclear bomb to build a reactor such
as the Tamuz reactor to get material for military purposes. As everybody knows, there are simple ways to achieve that goal: the
purchase of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium, or the construction of natural uranium reactors for making plutonium, for
82

example.

*

*

*

Where would we end up if a State were to proclaim itself judge
of the intentions of another State even though the latter was complying with the rules and disciplines of the international community in so sensitive an area as nuclear energy? More serious, per-

haps, is the scorn shown for the rules of international law.83

In conclusion, Mr. Leprette reaffirmed the French attachment to
Israeli security and pointed out that this could not be achieved by
resort to force." He added that the resolution to be adopted by
79. Id. at 16.
80. U.N. Doc. S./P.V. 2282 at 13-21 (1981) [hereinafter cited as S./P.V.
2282].
81. Id. at 16.

82. Id. at 17.
83. Id. at 18-20.
84. Id. at 21.
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the Council should contain these basic elements: "First, condemnation of the Israeli military action; secondly, a solemn appeal to
Israel to cease such military actions; and thirdly, equitable reparation for the destruction and damage for which Israel has publicly acknowledged responsibility." 85
On June 17 Mr. La Rocca, the Permanent Representative of
Italy, presented his government's appraisal.8 6 He rejected the Israeli allegations in regard to the character of the nuclear cooperation between Italy and Iraq.17 Stressing the importance of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iraq's compliance with its obligations under it, he added: "The conclusions of the work of this
Council should convey to Israel a clear signal that such behaviour
cannot be condoned by the international community. Morever, we
believe that the Government of Iraq is entitled to compensation
for the damage inflicted on the nuclear installations. '
Mr. Blum had stated on June 16 that Israel would not make
such reparations. He said:
Did the Allies pay reparations for the Nazis' atomic plants at
Peenemuende and elsewhere which they destroyed during the Second World War? Let me assure this Council that Israel will pay
precisely the same sum as what those who made this bizarre suggestion paid after the Second World War, and not one brass farthing more.8 9
F. The InternationalAtomic Energy Agency
Mr. Sigvard Eklund, then the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, presented a scientific appraisal of
the Iraqi nuclear program on June 19 and came to the same conclusions previously stated by the representatives of France and
Italy. 90 He concluded his statement with a consideration of the
larger implications of the Israeli attack:
In fulfilling its responsibilities the Agency has inspected the
Iraqi reactors and has not found evidence of any activity not in
accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, a
non-NPT country has evidently not felt assured by our findings
85. Id.
86. U.N. Doc. S./P.V. 2286 at 31-33 (1981).

87. Id. at 32.
88. Id.
89. S./P.V. 2284, supra note 65, at 37.
90. S./P.V. 2288, supra note 66, at 6-12.
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and by our ability to continue to discharge our safeguarding responsibilities effectively. In the interest of its national security, as
was stated by its leaders, it has felt motivated to take military action. From a point of principle, one can only conclude that it is the
Agency's safeguards system that has also been attacked. This, of
course, is a matter of grave concern to the International Atomic
Energy Agency and has to be pondered well. 921
G.

The Security Council Decision

The unanimous Security Council Resolution 487 of 19 June
198192 provided support for two of the four requests made by Foreign Minister Hammadi on June 12. It recognized "the inalienable sovereign right of Iraq" and of other states, "especially the
9 3
developing countries," to establish peaceful nuclear programs. It
also called upon Israel "urgently to place its nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards. 9 4 It did not impose mandatory sanctions
on Israel under the provisions of chapter VII of the Charter nor
did it decide that all states, and especially the United States,

shall refrain from providing Israel with military materials or technical cooperation or assistance. It was widely recognized that the
threat of a negative vote by the United States prohibited the
Council from meeting either of these Iraqi requests.
On June 19, following the unanimous resolution of the Security
Council, Mr. Al-Qaysi, the Legal Adviser of the Iraqi Foreign
Ministry, called the attention of the Council to the high degree of
selectivity, and consequent inaccuracy, in the quotation from Sir
Humphrey Waldock which Mr. Blum had twice provided to the
Council.9 5 Mr. Blum's quotation read exactly as follows: ".. . it
would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a
defending state to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. . . . To read Article 51 otherwise is to protect
the aggressor's right to the first strike."98 Mr. Al-Qaysi supplied
the entire Waldock quotation which provides:

91.
92.
(1981)
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 12.
S.C. Res. 487, 36 U.N. SCOR (2288th mtg.) (1981), U.N. Doc. S/Res/487
is set forth in the Appendix.
Id. para 4.
Id. para. 5.
S./P.V. 2288, supra note 66, at 72-73.

96. S./P.V. 2280, supra note 26, at 53-55, repeated in S./P.V. 2288, supra
note 66, at 33.
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The Charter prohibits the use of force except in self-defence.
The Charter obliges Members to submit to the Council or Assembly any dispute dangerous to peace which they cannot settle. Mem-

bers have therefore an imperative duty to invoke the jurisdiction of
the United Nations whenever a grave menace to their security develops carrying the probability of armed attack. But if the action
of the United Nations is obstructed, delayed or inadequate and the
armed attack becomes manifestly imminent, then it would be a
travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending
State to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal

blow. If an armed attack is imminent within the strict doctrine of
the Caroline, then it would seem to bring the case within Article
51. To read Article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right
to the first stroke.' 7

The position of Iraq as put forth by Mr. Hammadi on June 12
was supported fully by the statements of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, of France and Italy, and, indeed, by all

who made statements to the Council except the United States,
which provided something less than full support. The supporters

included the other permanent members of the Security Council,
Great Britain, 98 the Soviet Union, 99 and the People's Republic of

China, 1°° as well as the members elected for a term of years. The
latter are the German Democratic Republic, Ireland, Japan, Niger, Panama, Philippines, Spain, Tunisia, Uganda, and Mexico,

with the Mexican Permanent Reprentative, Mr. Munoz Ledo,
serving as President of the Council during June 1981.101 Similarly,
the reprIesentatives of other states and public organizations which
were invited to make presentations supported the basic elements
of the Iraqi complaint. 02 No appraisal supported the position advanced by Israel.
97. The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 HAGuE REcUEM DES CouRs 455, 498 (vol. 2, 1952), quoted in 5 M.
WHrmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 986 (1965).
98. S./P.V. 2282, supra note 80, at 41-45.
99. S./P.V. 2283 at 21-30 (1981).
100. Id. at 31-36.

101. The other appraisals presented to the Security Council are found in S.1
P.V. 2280, supra note 26, through S./P.V. 2288, supra note 66.
102. Id.
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V. THE EFFECTS OF THE JuNE 7 ATTACK

A. The Effects Upon the State of Israel
The Government of Israel claimed its national interests were at
stake and it is appropriate to consider these interests. The same
government regularly claims its national security is endangered.

One significant causal factor in this situation is the heavy overemphasis upon military methods which is seen by an increasing
number of thoughtful Israelis as counter-productive to national
security. Among the most important requirements of law set forth
in this study is that a unilateral determination by a state's decision-makers concerning claimed defensive measures is subject to
authoritative review by the community of states. The central
point was made in the context of criminal law by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. After holding that the
Nazi invasions of Norway and Denmark were not justified by the
law concerning anticipatory self-defense, 103 the court stated:
It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accordance with the reservations made by many of the Signatory Powers
at the time of the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, whether
preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her decision
her judgment was conclusive. But whether action taken under the
claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if international
law is ever to be enforced.1 '
A number of individuals whose commitment to Israel is unquestioned have raised fundamental matters concerning basic Israeli national interests. The only surviving founding father of the
State of Israel is Dr. Nahum Goldmann, a past president of the
World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress and a

close associate of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, first President of the
State of Israel. Dr. Goldmann has become a critic of Israeli policy
and practice and has strongly recommended that Israel assume a
neutral status. In an important statement, he wrote:
103. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBURG, supra note 4, at 204-09.
103.1. After the initial text of this Article went to press, Dr. Goldmann

passed on in August 1982.
104. Id. at 208. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was an attempt to improve the
world legal order. It lacked the doctrinal specifications and the sanctions provisions of the U.N. Charter. See The Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 94
L.N.T.S. 57.
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Israel is increasingly isolated politically and faces a growing danger of losing the support of world public opinion. The greatest

threat to Israel today is not Arab arms and the lack of financial
means but the slow erosion of world sympathy, particularly among
the progressive nations that have always supported Israel. 10 5
Israel's continuing lack of concern for the consensus of the
world community, as well as for the advice of friendly critics, is
manifested by its repeated attacks on civilians and civilian targets
in Southern Lebanon and elsewhere. It conducted a massive air
attack on an urban area of Beirut, resulting in more than a thousand civilian casualties, on June 17, 1981, while the Security
Council was still considering the June 7 attack on the Iraqi
reactor.
The late Moshe Sharett was the first Foreign Minister and the
second Prime Minister of the State of Israel. Since his death, his
carefully written and thoughtful diary, not intended for publication, has been published in Israel; more recently, portions of it
have become available in the United States. 10 His diary recounts
numerous Israeli military incursions which he states were misrepresented as acts of self-defense. He states: "What shocks and worries me is the narrow-mindedness and the short-sightedness of
our military leaders. They seem to presume that the State of

Israel may-or even must-behave in the realm of international

1
relations according to the laws of the jungle." 0
It should be mentioned that in a particularly significant respect
Prime Minister Begin probably has achieved the opposite of his

stated objective concerning the June 7 air attack. The attack and
the ensuing claims and counterclaims emphasized to the Arab
states the importance of developing a nuclear weapons capability
as a deterrent to Israel's nuclear threat. The only certain way to
prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle
East is for the world community, including the United States, to
force Israel to become a state-party to the NPT and to place its
nuclear establishment under IAEA inspection.
General Mattiyahu Peled, a retired officer of the Israeli Army,

105. True Neutrality for Israel, FOREIGN POL'Y no. 37 at 133, 140-41 (197980).
106. See L. ROKACH, ISRAEL'S SACRED TERRORISM: A STUDY BASED ON MosHE
SHARErr'S PERSONAL DLARy AND OTHER DocuMENTs (1980).

107. Id. at 21.
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commented upon the June 7 attack from a military perspective. 0 8
In his view, the military purpose of destroying a potential Iraqi
nuclear weapons capability has not been, and cannot be, accomplished. He points out that Iraq, like Egypt following the deep-

penetration Israeli air attacks, is being forced to construct an efficient air defense system. This will result in the Iraqi ability to
rebuild its nuclear establishment without interference and with
no Israeli capability to attack it successfully.
Former United States Secretary of Commerce Philip M. Klutznick, who served as president of the World Jewish Congress, is
well known as a consistent and thoughtful supporter of Israel. He
has raised fundamental questions and reached disturbing conclusions in an article in which he wrote:
Why did Israel act at this time and without consultations with
the United States, thus endangering present regional peace while
claiming to safeguard Israeli security in years ahead?1 0 9
Having accepted an arms dependency relationship with the U.S.,
can Israel reasonably insist on taking actions unacceptable and unexplainable to many and which threaten American regional
interests?1 0
B.

The Effects Upon the World Legal Order

The Israeli aerial attack on the Iraqi reactor is symptomatic of
a much larger problem. The problem, stated in its simplest form,
is whether Israel should be allowed to continue its course of unilateral military methods in violation of the standards of international law and the world legal order system. Another portion of
the article by Mr. Klutznick quoted above emphasizes the effects
of the June 7 attack on the world legal order:

The greater fears that deeply concern me are the long-term implications for world order of Israel's action ....
Tomorrow, Iraq or
some other unfriendly nation can indulge in a "suicide mission" on
Israel's Dimona reactor, or India can turn on Pakistan, the Soviet
Union on China. Israel has totally avoided this discussion as if only
Israel's interests are vital, only Israel's existence threatened. Yet,
in effect, Israel has breached the long and worrisome efforts to secure a measure of restraint in the nuclear age, with Israel's unilat108. The Baghdad Adventure, Ha'aretz, June 11, 1981, translated into English in Israeli Mirror, June 18, 1981, at 1-2 (London).
109. Christian Sci. Monitor, June 19, 1981, at 23, col. 1.
110. Id. col. 2.

19821

ISRAELI ATTACK

eral act creating a sense of anarchy and permissiveness hitherto
beyond acceptability.111
[T]he devil of preemptive attack has been loosed-all the worse
for Israel having acted without clearly exhausting all opportunities
for reaching a general peace in the region, which is surely the only
way in the long term to safeguard Israel's security.11 '
In view of the existing nuclear weapons capability of Israel,115 a
continuation of the unlimited support provided by the United
States will most likely lead to nuclear disaster. The only certain
way to prevent this is for the community of states to require
Israel to dismantle its nuclear weapons capability and become a
state-party to the NPT. This will require mandatory sanctions
under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
President Eisenhower made the essential world order point in
early 1957 following the tripartite attack upon Egypt and the initial refusal of Israel to withdraw from the then occupied
territories:
If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of
the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of
international order. We will, in effect, have countenanced the use
differences and
of force as a means of settling international
11 '
advantages.
national
gaining
this
through
President Eisenhower, acting in support of the United Natons legal order, forced Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied. The probable dangers confronting the Middle East and the
111. Id. col. 2-3.
112. Id. col. 4.
113. "[T]he group of Experts wishes'to emphasize that they do not doubt
that Israel, if it has not already crossed that threshold, has the capability to
manufacture nuclear weapons within a very short time." Report of the U.N. Secretary-General, Israeli Nuclear Armament 27, U.N. Doe. A/36/431 (1981). "For
at least two years the United States Government has been conducting its Middle

East policy on the assumption that Israel either posesses an atomic bomb or has
component parts available for quick assembly." Smith, U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
"The Israeli-French announcements in Paris confirmed earlier reports that
the reactor used natural uranium as a fuel and heavy water as a moderator and
coolant. This type of reactor, the same as the one employed by the United
States at its large plant at Savannah River, South Carolina, is particularly well
suited for producing the fissionable plutonium used in nuclear bombs." Finney,
U.S. Misled at First on Israeli Reactor, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1960, at 1, col. 2,
continuation at 15, col. 3.
114. 36 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 387, 389 (1957).

446

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:417

world today are much more severe than those present in 1956 and
1957. The alternative to enforcement of the world legal order now
is a nuclear war in the future. The Middle East, and possibly the
world, now lives under the potential of nuclear obliteration
brought on by the actions of the Government of Israel.

ISRAELI ATTACK

19821

APPENDIX
RESOLUTION 487 (1981)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2288th meeting on 19
June 1981
The Security Council,
Having considered the agenda contained in document S1

Agenda/2280,
Having-noted the contents of the telegram dated 8 June 1981
from the Foreign Minister of Iraq (S/14509),
Having heard the statements made to the Council on the
subject at its 2280th through 2288th meetings,
Taking note of the statement made by the Director-General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the
Agency's Board of Governors on the subject on 9 June 1981 and
his statement to the Council at its 2288th meeting on 19 June
1981,
Furthertaking note of the resolution adopted by the Board
of Governors of the IAEA on 12 June 1981 on the "military attack
on the Iraq nuclear research centre and its implications for the
Agency" (S/14532)
Fully aware of the fact that Iraq has been a party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since it
came into force in 1970, that in accordance with that Treaty Iraq
has accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities, and
that the Agency has testified that these safeguards have been satisfactorily applied to date,
Noting furthermore that Israel has not adhered to the nonproliferation Treaty,
Deeply concerned about the danger to international peace
and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on
Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June 1981, which could at any
time explode the situation in the area, with grave consequences
for the vital interests of all States,
Consideringthat, under the terms of Article 2, paragraph 4,
of the Charter of the United Nations: "All Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations",
1. Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of
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international conduct;
2. Calls upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such
acts or threats thereof;
3. Furtherconsiders that the said attack constitutes a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards regime which is the
foundation of the non-proliferation Treaty;
4. Fully recognizes the inalienable sovereign right of Iraq,
and all other States, especially the developing countries, to establish programmes of technological and nuclear development to de-

velop their economy and industry for peaceful purposes in accordance with their present and future needs and consistent with the
internationally accepted objectives of preventing nuclear-weapons
proliferation;
5. Calls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards;
6. Considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for
the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been
acknowledged by Israel;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security

Council regularly informed of the implementation of this
resolution.
S.C. Res. 487, 36 U.N. SCOR (2288th mtg.) (1981), U.N. Doc. S1
Res/487 (1981)

